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TZID:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20181028T030000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
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DTSTART:20190331T020000
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UID:calendar.13585.field_data.0@www.ugovricerca.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260405T040025Z
CREATED:20181122T123629Z
DESCRIPTION:We consider the question of whether the transfers of truthful m
 echanisms can be defined in a way to make the cost of every agent equal. W
 e want to marry this natural notion of equal-cost fairness with truthfulne
 ss. Given the known limitations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechani
 sm\, which can be cast as a truthful equal-cost mechanism\, we focus on mo
 nitoring – a paradigm wherein the designer can force overbidding agents to
  pay the reported bid. In this context\, we show how and when approximatio
 n\, of both optimisation and money burning objective functions\, can be re
 conciled with this combination of fairness and truthfulness. We study with
 in this paradigm three broad classes of optimisation problems: makespan ma
 chine scheduling\, bottleneck network design and binary covering problems 
 with social cost minimisation. For each of these classes we provide close 
 upper and lower bounds on the approximation guarantees of truthful equal-c
 ost mechanisms with monitoring.Joint work with Dimitris Fotakis and Carmin
 e Ventre.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20181129T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20181129T120000
LAST-MODIFIED:20191008T082735Z
LOCATION:Room B203\, II floor
SUMMARY:Equal-Cost Mechanism Design with Monitoring - Piotr Krysta (Univers
 ity of Liverpool)
URL;TYPE=URI:http://www.ugovricerca.uniroma1.it/node/13585
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