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UID:calendar.23265.field_data.0@www.ugovricerca.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260406T005919Z
CREATED:20210403T132917Z
DESCRIPTION:DescrizioneValerio DOSE\, vincitore della procedura selettiva p
 er n. 1 posto di ricercatore a tempo determinato di tipologia A – SC 01/A6
  - SSD MAT/09 - Dipartimento di ingegneria informatica automatica e gestio
 nale Antonio Ruberti bando n. 5/2020 RTDA\, terrà presso questo dipartimen
 to un seminario su attività di ricerca svolte e in corso di svolgimento.Lu
 ogo Modalità telematica su MeetAbstractThe Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a mea
 sure of how much\, in a congested network\, the selfish behaviour of the u
 sers provides an inefficient distribution of traffic with respect to the s
 ocial optimum. Recent literature suggests that in light or heavy traffic c
 ondition\, selfish routing tends to be efficient. Other studies have empir
 ically shown that in real networks\, for intermediate levels of traffic\, 
 the PoA oscillates and exhibits some kinks at specific values of the deman
 d\, often without reaching the worst case bounds. In this work\, we study 
 the PoA as a function of the traffic inflow\, considering its behaviour fo
 r intermediate amounts of traffic\, between zero and infinity. We will pre
 sent some of the relevant literature on the topic and new results concerni
 ng the PoA function in networks with affine or just continuous nondecreasi
 ng cost functions. We will also introduce intereresting open questions and
  new lines of research.Short BioValerio Dose obtained his Ph.D. in Mathema
 tics in 2015 from the University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'\, with a thesis in 
 Algebraic Geometry and Number Theory. The following two years he was a pos
 tdoc at INdAM\, and later he spent three years as a postdoc in the Departm
 ent of Economics and Finance at LUISS 'Guido Carli'\, where he has been wo
 rking in Game Theory with an emphasis on routing in networks. The output o
 f his research can be found in several papers on international journals an
 d proceedings. He is currently an Adjunct Professor of Mathematics at LUIS
 S 'Guido Carli'. 
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20210409T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20210409T100000
LAST-MODIFIED:20210404T083011Z
LOCATION:Online piattaforma Meet codice accesso fmn-owxb-jkz
SUMMARY:Seminario pubblico Valerio DOSE - The Price of Anarchy in Routing G
 ames as a function of the demand:  how the amount of traffic affects the e
 fficiency of selfish routing - Valerio Dose
URL;TYPE=URI:http://www.ugovricerca.uniroma1.it/node/23265
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